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EvidenceConfirmed8 Mar 2014

West-track disclosure lag — ministerial 10:30, ARCC 22:30, Thai 9–10 days

8 March and 18–19 March 2014

Open in cross-ref

Hishammuddin 1 May 2014: military radar playback ~08:30 MYT 8 March, Air Force ops ~09:00, minister informed ~10:30 of a possible turn-back; a military aircraft west at 10:54. KL ARCC was not informed by RMAF of the western last-known until 22:30 MYT — a roughly 12-hour operational gap. Thai Surat Thani radar disclosed 18–19 March.

These statements can coexist: political/military chain knew earlier; civilian SAR centre received formal RMAF information later. They do not by themselves prove concealment from international investigators. Hishammuddin 13 Mar 2014: Malaysia would not ordinarily release raw military-radar data but had shared it with partners including the US and China. Kok Soo Chon 2019: the investigation possessed the complete original radar data; raw military data unpublished because classified. ‘Not released publicly’ is confirmed; ‘withheld from international investigators’ is not supported by those statements. Thai Air Force: Surat Thani painted an unknown/non-normal target ~01:28 MYT, southwest/back toward Malaysia then Butterworth/Malacca; not shared initially because it did not threaten Thai airspace and Malaysia’s early request was not specific. Indonesia 14–19 Mar: Lhokseumawe and Sabang did not detect a crossing; Lhokseumawe ~240 nm; denial of concealment. Negative Indonesian evidence constrains northern-Sumatra routes only after coverage, horizon and thresholds are reconstructed.

Sources

  • Hishammuddin statement, 1 May 2014
  • Malaysian Safety Investigation Report 2018, SAR chronology
  • Thai Air Force statements, 18–19 March 2014
  • Indonesian Air Force/Defence, 14–19 March 2014
  • Kok Soo Chon, 2019

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