Remote-control claims versus evidence gaps

Five panels. (1) The claim that a 2014 777 could not be flown remotely sits next to a demonstrated fact: Boeing and the USAF flew QF-16 as an unmanned full-scale target. That is maturity of a different airframe, not fitment on 9M-MRO. (2) US7142971B2 describes remote engagement, dedicated comms, cockpit lockout and automatic landing at a predetermined — including military — site. Official language to the Annex 13 team was that this was not implemented on commercial aircraft at delivery. That denial addresses one pathway. (3) Standard avionics (SDU, ACARS, FMS, ARINC 429, autopilot) are the other pathway. Hugo Teso’s 2013 Hack in the Box work showed that FMS logic could be manipulated in a research setting; FAA disputed operational risk; the gap is whether 9M-MRO’s specific buses and software accepted an unauthorised external command. (4) Service history still to rebuild: SDU upgrades, MAS engineering records, the 2012 Shanghai wing-tip repair, avionics and data-bus software versions. (5) Radar at IGARI proves movement and a sharp turn, not identity of the flying agent — human, selected autopilot, pre-programmed FMS, or remote command could all draw a similar path. The board’s status line: incomplete documentation relative to the scale of the incident.